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CORA MILLETT, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
v. 
CLARK CLINIC CORPORATION, ) 
Defendant-Respondent.) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16542 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-appellant 
alleging medical malpractice on the part of the defendant-
respondent, Clark Clinic Corporation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David Sam, Judge, entered its 
Order dismissing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice on 
June 11, 1979. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Clark Clinic Corporation seeks an 
affirmance of the Order of Dismissal of June 11, 1979. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts 
presented by appellant in her Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT TIMELY FTI..ED AND HENCE WAS 
PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE LOWER COURT. 
On August 17, 1978, appellant served a Notice of Iru 
to Commence Action on respondent herein. This action arises 
out of an alleged malpractice occurring either on September 
1976, or on November 2, 1976. The lower court in its rulin1 
found that: 
the notice was given within 90 days of 
the expiration of the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations v1hich in the case 
at hand had expired either on September 23, 
1978 or November 2, 1978. (R. 38) 
The lower court went on to point out that the August 
1978 Notice of Intent to Commence Action extended the time 
for filing the complaint to November 17, 1978 under the Utcl 
Health Care Malpractice Act (Section 78-14-l, et seq.) as i~ 
was originally passed by the Utah Legislature in 1976, or a 
December 17, 1978 pursuant to the amendments to said Act 
found in H.B.l64. 
Appellant's complaint was filed on January 18, 1979. 
well after the applicable statute of limitations had expir~ 
The lower court was therefore correct in dismissing appellar 
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complaint and said dismissal should be affirmed by this 
Honorable Court. 
POINT II 
SECTIONS 78-12-41 AND 78-14-8 ARE IN DISTINCT CHAPTERS OF 
THE UTAH CODE AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER. 
Appellant argues that the provisions of Section 78-12-41 
dictate that the 90-day waiting period provided for in Section 
78-14-8 should not be counted in computing when the statute of 
limitations bas expired. 
Section 78-12-41 is in the chapter of Title 78 entitled 
"Limitation of Actions." Section 78-12-1 states: 
Civil actions can be commenced only 
within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action shall 
have accrued, excett where in special 
cases a differentimitation is rescribed 
by statute. Emphasis added. 
It is respectfully submitted that Section 78-14-1 et seq. 
is one of those "special cases" where a "different limitation 
is prescribed." Chapter 14 of Title 78 is a completely self-
contained law relating to malpractice actions against health 
care providers. Said chapter has its own legislative findings 
and declarations, definitions of terms and mode of procedure. 
It is clear that the Legislature intended for this chapter to 
stand alone without reference to Chapter 12 on Limitation of 
Actions. 
As a gen2ral rule: 
In construing a special statute of 
limitations the courts will not read 
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another statute into it and thus 
incorporate exceptions not contained 
therein or give it any new or unusual 
interpretation. (51 AmJur 2d 709, 
Limitation of Actions, Section 138.) 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
It is respectfully submitted that had the Utah 
·Legislature intended that the Malpractice Act be construed al1 
with the provisions of Chapter 12, Title 78, it could easily 
have expressed such an intent. Instead, the Legislature incl1 
the following language as the last sentence of Section 78-14-1 
If the notice is served less than 
ninety days prior to the expiration of 
the applicable time period, the time 
for commencing the malpractice action 
against the health care provider shall 
be extended to ninety days from the date 
of service of notice. 
It is clear fro~ this statement the Legislature intern 
that the ninety-day period after the service of a Notice of 
Intent to Commence Action was to be included within the two-
year statute of limitations and was not intended to be excludi 
as appellant contends would be required by Section 78-12-41. 
POINT III 
THE CASE OF GOMEZ v. VALLEY VIEW SANITARIUM, CITED BY APPELLJ\: 
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
Appellant cites Gomez found at 151 Cal. Rptr. 97 
(App.l978), as being applicable to the case at bar. A closer 
study of the California Code of Civil Procedure shows that th· 
situation found in Gomez, supra, is distinguishable from that 
in the case at bar. 
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Section 364(d) of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
is found in Title 2 of said Code entitled "Time of Commencing 
Civil Actions." This section is similar to the last sentence 
of Section 78-14-8 in that it extends the statute of limitations 
to ninety days from the service of a notice when the notice is 
served less than ninety days before the expiration of the 
statute of limitations. However, Section 356 of the California 
Code, which is the equivalent of Utah's Section 78-12-41, is 
likewise found in Title 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It 
was therefore proper for the California Court to construe 
Section 364(d) together with Section 356. The analysis under 
Point II above, however, has shown that it would not be proper 
for this Court to construe Section 78-14-8 and Section 78-12-41 
together. Therefore, Gomez is inapposite. 
POINT IV 
BECAUSE THE MALPRACTICE ACT CREATES A SPECIAL STATUTORY 
LIABILITY, SAID ACT IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED 
IN THE GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Section 78-14-4(1) provides in pertinent part: 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider maB be brought unless it . 
is commenced wit in two years ... (Emphasls 
added.) 
This language indicates that the Utah Legislature was in 
effect creating a special statutory cause of action. That 
being the case, the following language from 51 AmJur 2d 715, 
Limitations of Actions, Section 145, is directly applicable to 
the case at bar: 
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A statute wh~ch creates a special 
statutory liability ... and provides that 
no action shall be brought therefor, 
except within a designated period will 
not as a rule be subject to the 
exceptions contained in the general statute 
of limitations. (Emphasis added.) (Citing, 
inter alia, Ames v. Department of Labor 
and Industries, 30 P.2d 239, 91 ALR 1392. 
Wash.l934..) 
It is submitted that because of the special nature of 
a malpractice action against a health care provider under the 
Utah Health Care Halpractice Act, the provisions of that Act 
should not be construed as being subject to the exception 
contained in Section 78-12-41. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing analys 
has shown that the lower court correctly dismissed appellant's 
action as being barred by the applicable Statute of Limitation 
and furthermore that Section 78-12-41 is inapplicable to the 
case at bar. Therefore, this Honorable Court should affirm 
the decision of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
{ s) 
R. H. Child 
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This is to certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following counsel of record this f~ day of October, 1979: 
Anthony M. Thurber, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
211 East Broadway, No. 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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